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WHERE WERE WE?
Until  September 11,  2001,  the United States 
had limited experience with  terrorist  attacks 
on  our own  soil,  and only  intermittent 
experience with  attacks overseas.  During the 
1970s and 80s,  airline hijackings and 
overseas bombings were the focus of most 
terrorist  activity.  In  1993, violent  Islamist 
extremists bombed the World Trade Center, 
causing six  deaths and more than a  thousand 
injuries, but  failing  to significantly  damage 
the structures themselves. During  the next 
decade,  several domestic focused Islamist 
terrorist  plots were foiled at  the planning 
stage; however,  additional attacks were 
conducted overseas,  by  operatives of 
Hezbollah  killing  US service personnel in 
1996  at the Khobar  Towers complex  in  Saudi 
Arabia, by  al Qaeda  bombing  of US embassies 
in  East  Africa  in  1998,  and the attack  on the 
USS Cole near  Yemen in 2000. The most 
deadly  attack domestically  during the 1990s 
was the Oklahoma  City  bombing,  carried out 
by  Timothy  McVeigh,  an  anti-government 
extremist.
All  of these attacks and attempts were 
addressed through  the existing  criminal 
justice system.  Under  that  legal architecture, 
the Foreign  Intelligence Surveillance Act  and 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act,  as well as a  host  of other 
statutes and regulations,  governed domestic 
intel l igence col lect ion. Exchange of 
information  collected by  foreign  and 
domestic agencies was determined by  a  strict 
set  of rules that was (perhaps somewhat 
incorrectly) interpreted as forbidding  pure 
“intelligence” information  from  being 
collected for  law  enforcement purposes,  and 
– conversely  – made it difficult to share 
criminal  justice-derived information  with 
other  agencies.  When terrorists were 
apprehended either  in  the United States or 
abroad, they  were accorded the treatment  of 
any  other  criminal  defendant, including 
receiving  warnings about  the right  to silence, 
and a full-blown criminal jury trial.
The attacks of September  11, 2001  and the 
consequent  retrospective investigations – 
such as the 9/11 Commission Report – 
exposed the inadequacy  of this architecture 
in  addressing and thwarting  further  attacks. 
The inability  to coordinate information 
collection  and integration  among  various 
agencies led to the failure to identify  patterns 
of behavior  that  might have provided warning 
of attack. Rules designed to govern  electronic 
surveillance in  the days of fixed land-line 
communications were difficult  to apply  to 
communications media such  as mobile, 
disposable telephones or  voice over  internet 
communications. And even when  terrorists 
were identified and apprehended, difficulties 
in  providing  evidence admissible  in 
traditional  courtroom  proceedings left 
authorities with  few  avenues to detain  or 
incapacitate them.
For  the fundamental lesson was this: a 
counterterrorism  architecture that is founded 
o n  c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e p r i n c i p l e s i s 
fundamentally  oriented to punishing  those 
who have plotted or  carried out  attacks.  But 
with  the danger  to innocent life posed by 
modern terrorism, prevention and not 
punishment  becomes the critical driver  for 
counterterrorism.  And that  required 
refashioning our legal tool set.
This refashioning focused on  three 
elements of the counterterrorism  process: 
inte l l igence co l lec t ion , in format ion 
integration,  and terrorist  incapacitation.  The 
first  refers to how  we can better  collect 
information  in  real  time within  the context  of 
modern  global communication, travel, and 
finance.  The second focuses on  how  we can 
b e t t e r  c o m b i n e a n d i n t e g r a t e t h a t 
information  once collected. And the third 
addresses how  we can  act  on that information 
to incapacitate terrorists at  the earliest  stage 
before they can advance their operations.
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WHERE ARE WE?
Intelligence Collection 
In  the wake of the attacks of September  11, 
the Bush Administration worked with 
Congress to update some of the rules 
governing  interception  of electronic 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d t o s t r e a m l i n e 
information  requests. The USA  PATRIOT 
Act,  passed overwhelmingly,  updated 
electronic  surveillance rules to allow  warrants 
to intercept individuals even when they 
frequently  changed phones,  and to grant 
access to Internet  communications on  the 
same basic  terms as applicable to traditional 
telephone communications.
Somewhat  more controversial was the 
implementation of regulations designed to 
collect routine traveler  and financial 
information. During  the past  decade, the 
United States government  implemented US 
VISIT,  a  program  that  captures fingerprints 
from  all  foreign travelers entering  the United 
States. The government  also exerted its right 
under the Chicago Aviation  Convention  to 
collect  from  the airlines commercial travel 
data  relating  to inbound travelers.  This kind 
of data  proved crucial in  identifying high-risk 
travelers who are connected with  known or 
suspected terrorists.  Based on  these “red 
flags,”  aviation  and border  security  officials 
can  now  take a  closer  look at  these travelers 
from  among the millions who cross our 
borders each day.
The legality  of these efforts has never  been 
seriously  challenged under  US constitutional 
or  statutory  law.  European  data  protection 
officials,  however, resisted the use of 
commercial data  on  the grounds that it 
invaded the privacy  of European  travelers 
under European  laws. The clash  between 
international law  giving  the US the right  to 
vet  all incoming  air  travelers and European 
law  seeking  to cloak the privacy  of those 
travelers threatened to cause disruption  in 
the air  industry. Fortunately  this was averted 
for  the time being through  a  US-European 
Union agreement  that  set  an  acceptable 
framework  to accommodate security  and 
privacy concerns.
A  similar  legal impasse arose from  US 
government  efforts to collect  information 
from  the so-called SWIFT  system, an 
interbank network that exchanges global 
financial transactions every  day. Government 
collection of this data under  legal process 
allowed quick identification of suspicious 
movement  of funds that might  be used to 
support terrorist  operations. This was 
precisely  the type of smart intelligence 
collection advocated by  the 9/11  Commission. 
In  2006, however, the New  York  Times  chose 
to reveal  the existence of the SWIFT 
collection program, thereby  not only  giving 
warning to terrorist  financiers but provoking 
another  privacy  dispute with  European 
authorities.  Ironically, as even  the Times 
acknowledged, the legal underpinnings of the 
SWIFT  program  were not open  to serious 
question.
Perhaps the most  controversial change in 
collection architecture arose from  a  dispute 
over  the legality  of an  electronic surveillance 
program  directed at intercepting  certain 
international communications. The conflict 
was resolved by  the passage of the FISA  Act 
Amendments,  which  provided the US 
government  with  additional  procedures and 
specific limitations to collecting  information 
and intelligence from  foreign  terrorists and 
their  affiliates located outside of the United 
States. 
Information Integration  
Perhaps the most well  known  finding  of the 
9/11  Commission  was the missed warning 
signs that arose from  a  “failure to connect  the 
dots”  of individual intelligence items.  This 
failure arose from  institutional and cultural 
obstacles within  the intelligence agencies, but 
also from  a  legal approach  to the relationship 
between  law  enforcement  and intelligence 
collection that  built  a substantial barrier  to 
information  sharing.  The PATRIOT Act 
amended the law  to dramatically  lower  the 
legal  barrier  to sharing,  and to create a 
presumption  of sharing  rather  than  an 
inhibition  against  sharing.  Ironically,  a  later 
court  decision  by  the FISA  Court  of Review 
established that  the previous interpretation 
of the FISA  restriction on information 
sharing  was unduly  stringent, and reflected 
an  overly  cautious approach  to the legal 
requirement.
Little  legal  controversy  has arisen  in  the 
United States over  information sharing, 
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although  cultural  barriers within  the agencies 
remain,  most recently  demonstrated by  the 
failure to integrate warning  information of 
the would-be 2009  Christmas bomber,  Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab.  European  views on 
information  sharing  remain dramatically 
different, however,  with  a  strong bias against 
allowing integration of information  from 
individual  databases. For  this reason, 
American and European officials have 
engaged in  lengthy  negotiations over the 
years about how  willing the latter  are to share 
biographic  and biometric  data  even about 
individuals who are known  criminals or 
terrorists. This information is not simply 
beneficial  to the United States. Using  known 
information  about individuals,  such as travel 
information, is an  essential tool for detecting 
potentially  dangerous individuals associated 
with  terrorism  and transnational criminal 
activity. Despite the differences between  the 
US and European  officials, information 
sharing agreements involving  travel 
information  and methods of payment exist 
today  and incorporate appropriate privacy 
protect ions for  indiv idual personal 
information. As a  result, the US has been  able 
to enforce our  border  and immigration  laws 
by  disrupting,  denying  and dismantling 
terrorist  travel  as well as human  trafficking 
and drug smuggling  networks seeking  to 
enter our nation.
Incapacitation
The most controversial elements of the new 
legal  architecture for  counterterrorism  arise 
from  the question  of how  to incapacitate 
someone apprehended here or  overseas as a 
terrorist.
For  the first  several  years after  the 
September  11  attacks,  Congress took  no 
action to address the issue of incapacitation, 
as it had done with  the issues of intelligence 
collection and sharing through  the PATRIOT 
Act. The question of detention  and 
punishment  evolved within  the Executive 
Branch. Alongside the customary  criminal 
justice architecture,  the Bush  Administration 
established a  military  commission  structure, 
drawing upon the historical  model of military 
commissions that  were impaneled during  the 
Civil War  and the Second World War and its 
aftermath. Military  commissions – applicable 
only  to non-US citizens – were designed to 
mete our  punishment for  the laws of war  in 
the same way  that  the civilian  justice system 
had punished terrorists for  violating  civilian 
laws.
Neither the courts nor  the commissions, 
however,  had a clear  mechanism  for 
detaining  operatives who were terrorist 
threats before they  were charged with  a  crime 
and punished. Such detention  was available 
for  those in the civilian  system  after  charges 
were leveled,  but that  process required 
willingness to proceed to a  trial in  relatively 
short  order. Especially  for  those caught  on 
the battlefield overseas,  where admissible 
evidence might  be difficult  to assemble, 
beginning  the criminal justice process was 
impractical.  Moreover, civilian  arrest  and 
charging  triggered the right  to silence,  which 
frustrates the process of questioning for 
intelligence gathering, which  was a  primary 
objective when capturing terrorists.
Under these circumstances, the Bush 
Administration  asserted the right  to detain 
and hold enemy  belligerents without  trial  or 
even  military  commission  in  line with  the 
traditional authority  of the military  to hold 
prisoners in wartime.  What  was unclear  in 
the initial  stages of the conflict  in  Afghanistan 
was exactly  what procedural mechanisms 
would be made available to assure those held 
were, in  fact, affiliated with  terrorists, and 
how  this would mesh  with  various procedures 
mandated under the Geneva Convention.
Over  the subsequent  ten  years,  the 
evolution  of the detention and incapacitation 
process has been  ad hoc,  if not  at  times 
chaotic.   Contrary  to conventional  wisdom  – 
indeed, conventional myth  – the Bush 
Administration  did not simply  push  all 
suspected terrorists into the military  system. 
Generally, the Administration  charged 
Americans and those captured on  American 
soil in  the civilian  criminal justice system. 
Only  two individuals apprehended in  the 
United States were detained as military 
belligerents; each of these was eventually 
charged and convicted in  US civilian  courts. 
On the other  hand,  non-Americans 
apprehended overseas were generally 
detained in  military  facilities (including 
Guantanamo), and some began  to be charged 
o r p r o c e s s e d t h r o u g h  t h e m i l i t a r y 
commission system.  Thus,  the Bush 
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Administration  in  practical terms deployed 
both  civilian  and military  legal  systems to 
handle issues of detention, with  a  rough 
presumption  that those apprehended in the 
US and American citizens would be 
addressed through  the former,  and those 
non-citizens captured overseas would be 
addressed through the latter.
What  was far  less settled was the review  to 
be afforded to those non-citizens held in 
military  custody.  Congress’ failure to 
establish  a  process, and the Defense 
Department’s restrictive approach  to detainee 
rights, provoked ever  more vigorous judicial 
review  and eventual ly  a  s ignif icant 
overturning  of parts of that  system. While the 
Supreme Court affirmed the fundamental 
right  of the president  to detain  and hold 
enemy  belligerents during hostilities,  the 
Court  eventually  granted at least detainees in 
Guantanamo some legal  latitude to challenge 
the bases for their  confinement  by  filing 
habeas corpus petitions in  federal court. 
When  Congress finally  engaged in  2007 
through  the Military  Commissions Act, the 
Congressional  effort  to limit this review  was 
struck down  by  the Court.  As a  result, the 
exact  scope of review  for  detainees in 
Guantanamo – let  alone elsewhere – remains 
murky.  A recent  survey  of individual cases 
suggests that  the government  prevails in  the 
vast majority of challenges to date.
The advent  of the Obama  Administration 
was widely  expected to herald a  sea  change in 
the approach  to detention.  After  the 
president on  his first  day  declared his intent 
to close Guantanamo, advocacy  groups 
eagerly  anticipated a return to the pre-9/11 
legal  architecture for  detention, operating 
exclusively  through the criminal justice 
system.  Early  returns suggested this change 
would occur, and the announced decision by 
Attorney  General Eric Holder  to try  Khalid 
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coconspirators in federal court in  New  York 
was the apogee of this movement. But  strong 
resistance – and perhaps a strong dose of 
reality  triggered by  the near  success of the 
2009  Christmas Day  bomber  – began  to 
reverse direction. Over  the last year, the 
Obama  Administration  has indicated that  the 
9/11  conspirators will be tried in  military 
commissions, and while other  terrorists have 
been  tried in  civilian  courts,  that mixed 
approach  is largely  consistent with  the 
p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h  o f t h e B u s h 
Administration. Perhaps most  notable  as a 
symbolic reversal,  however, is the continued 
vitality  of terrorist detention  at  Guantanamo, 
a  practice that  is likely  to continue in the 
f u t u r e g i v e n  s t r o n g  C o n g r e s s i o n a l 
prohibitions against  bringing  Guantanamo 
terrorist detainees into the United States.
However  inelegantly  evolved,  the current 
legal  structure for  incapacitating  terrorists 
seems a  rough compromise between  security 
and civi l  l iberties concerns, and is 
distinguished by  a  remarkable  degree of 
continuity  between the Bush  and Obama 
Administrations.  The executive branch’s 
authority  to detain enemy  belligerents has 
been  affirmed by  both  presidents,  and by  the 
Supreme Court.  Some court review  is 
afforded those held in the United States and 
in  Guantanamo, but  the rules of that review 
remain indistinct  and uncertain.  Military 
commissions are funct ioning  under 
somewhat  more generous ru les for 
defendants,  but  no case has yet worked itself 
through the process. And legal  adviser 
Harold Koh  – who as dean of Yale Law 
School was an outspoken  critic of the Bush 
Administration  counterterrorism  policy  on 
civil  liberties grounds – has recently  issued a 
full throated defense of the president’s right 
to order the killing of terrorists overseas. 
WHERE SHOULD WE BE?
Although  the legal architecture governing 
intelligence collection has adapted to new 
technologies in  the last  ten years,  new 
challenges emerge.  As cyber  crime and 
“hacktivism”  increase in  frequency  and 
consequence, the government’s ability  to 
monitor  in  real time for  malicious code and 
similar  cyber  hacking  tools is constrained by 
real uncertainty  about  the legal effects of the 
rules for  electronic  communications 
surveillance. If the malicious code is buried in 
the flow  of Internet  packets that delivers the 
stream  of communication,  does that mean 
those packets can  only  be scanned under  the 
re lat ively  str ingent  rules governing 
interception  of communications? Or does the 
fact  that  the scanning  is undertaken at  the 
packet  level mean  surveillance rules should 
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not apply,  since  malicious computer 
instructions rather  than  intel l igible 
communications are being sought? Sorting 
this legal  conundrum, with  far-reaching 
implications for  both security  and freedom  of 
the Internet,  is one of the overpowering  legal 
challenges confronting us today.
By  contrast,  information  sharing  is on 
firmer legal footing  in  the United States.  Here 
the continuing  effort will be to resolve 
ongoing  disputes with  the European  Union, 
which  has reopened the controversy  over 
American  use of inbound airline passenger 
commercial data.
Finally,  and most unsettled,  are the legal 
rules that  will govern  detention  of terrorist 
suspects.  The current structure,  fashioned 
case by  case though  the courts, leaves many 
questions unresolved. Issues of burdens of 
proof, what kind of evidence is admissible 
and what  proof is sufficient,  await definitive 
answers. Only  Congress has the institutional 
capability  and authority  to fashion  a 
comprehensive procedure for  reviewing  these 
cases that balance practical  security  concerns 
and fundamental fairness. Unless the 
administration  and the legislators find the 
time and will  to address these issues, 
uncertainties in  our  legal framework for 
detention  will  result in  a  system  that  is less 
than  optimal from  both  security  and liberty 
standpoints.
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